American Culture in the 1930s_David Eldridge
With the Wall Street Crash in late October 1929 and the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor in December 1941, most accounts of American history present ‘the thirties’ as a decade with ready-made ‘bookends’: two shocking events which underscore the unremittingly traumatic nature of the intervening years. As a financial event, the Crash serves as a symbolic watershed, ending the prosperity of the ‘Roaring Twenties’ and putting economic history at the very centre of ensuing narratives (even if the stock market collapse did not cause the Depression itself). On this account Pearl Harbor marks the resolution of the crisis, in the sense that the war economy restored prosperity to the United States. It also denotes a new age of international engagement after a decade focused on domestic problems, and the end of a period of social reform as President Franklin Delano Roosevelt went from being ‘Dr New Deal’ to ‘Dr Win-the-War’. Like any decade, of course, the very notion of ‘the thirties’ is a post facto construct, an abstraction of more symbolic freight and critical convenience than a reflection of genuine historical experience. The effort to categorize that decade with a central theme is likewise only ever an effort to impose an ‘orienting sense of cohesion and unity’ on the ‘inconsistencies, tensions and cacophony of voices’ that constitute the complexity of any given moment in time.1 Yet despite awareness of how simplistic and problematic the construct is, the fundamental narrative of the United States in the 1930s remains that of the Great Depression.
Never before had Americans encountered such a widespread economic failure. Of course, the Depression did not become ‘Great’ until 1931 or so; what began in the summer of 1929 was at first regarded as an ordinary recession. Unemployment may have risen to 4.3 million by 1930, but this still seemed less significant than the previous recession of 1921 when the jobless had numbered 4.9 million and gross national product (GNP) had fallen by 24 per cent. The stock market crash had been a major shock: from 23 October to the middle of November, some $26 billion in paper values evaporated, with the $16.4 million loss on ‘Black Thursday’ (29 October) setting a record that lasted for almost forty years. Nevertheless, many commentators at the time saw even this as an unalarming correction to an abnormal bubble of giddy speculation and, contrary to the popular image, relatively few individual investors were affected directly, with only 2.5 per cent of the population owning stock. Indeed, it was not until late 1930 that the crisis really became apparent, when mobs of depositors descended on banks in Kentucky, Illinois and Missouri to withdraw their savings in cash and gold, leading 600 banks to collapse in just sixty days. The cause of this great loss of confidence has never been entirely certain, though many commercial banks had been blighted by the Crash having financed loans for stock speculation at the height of the 1920s boom. Whatever the reason though, 1,000 banks had failed by the end of the year, and a series of further panics practically shut down the American banking system by 1933.
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